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BETWEEN LIGHT AND SHADOW:   
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AGAINST GENOCIDE IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE’S JUDGMENT IN 
CROATIA V. SERBIA (2015) 
Ines Gillich* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article identifies and critically analyzes the 
contributions the International Court of Justice (ICJ) made to 
the international law against genocide via the judgment in 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) of 
February 3, 2015. This Article elaborates on the concept of 
genocide—a term that has originally been coined after the 
Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust—and the protection 
against this “crime of crimes” under international law. The 
analysis section of this Article refers to the historical and 
procedural context of the dispute between Croatia and Serbia 
in the case, which originates from the violent conflict between 
the two states following the dissolution of the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The main section of 
this Article criticizes the most important aspects of the ICJ’s 
judgment, especially the Court’s assessment of the constituent 
elements of genocide, the objective and the subjective 
components, while also taking into account the ICJ’s prior 
judgment in the Bosnian Genocide Case of 2007. The Article 
concludes that the ICJ’s reasoning is in line with its prior 
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judgment. However, the Article criticizes that the Court has 
missed opportunities to clarify on questions of jurisdiction and 
of its relationship with International Criminal Tribunals. It 
also failed to shed light on the interpretation of the crime of 
genocide as an international wrongful act of states with respect 
to many important and highly controversial issues, thus 
missing the opportunity to establish clearer guidelines for 
many disputed aspects in the determination of genocide in 
future disputes. 
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On February 3, 2015, the International Court of Justice 
[hereinafter ICJ] delivered its judgment in the case brought by 
Croatia against Serbia concerning the Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.1 The ICJ rejected—by fifteen votes to two—Croatia’s 
claim that Serbia was responsible for committing genocide 
during the armed conflict between Croatian and Serb forces in 
regions that are now part of Croatia’s territory between 1991 
and 1995. The ICJ also rejected Serbia’s counter-claim that 
Croatia, in turn, should be held responsible for committing 
genocide during a military operation in 1995. The ICJ 
concluded that, even though the acts committed by both parties 
fulfilled the physical element of genocide (actus reus), the 
mental element (mens rea)—which requires a specific intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group—was lacking on 
the side of both states. 
Even though the decision technically only binds the two 
parties, its significance reaches far beyond the dispute. This is 
because genocide cases against states (unlike cases against 
individual perpetrators) are seldom brought before 
international courts. This case, therefore, provided the ICJ 
with the opportunity to further sharpen the contours of 
genocide under the Genocide Convention.2 Grabbing this 
chance, the ICJ meticulously elaborated on the constituent 
elements of genocide as well as on important questions of proof 
and evidence. In addition to the difficulties in determining the 
substantive elements of this international crime, a 
jurisdictional problem further complicated the case: the ICJ 
was asked to assess acts that had been committed before 
                                                          
1  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), Merits, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 118 (Feb. 3), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/118/18422.pdf [hereinafter Judgment]. 
2  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide 
Convention]. 
3
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Serbia became a party to the Genocide Convention. As a 
general principle, the Genocide Convention binds only state 
parties with respect to acts that took place after the date when 
the state becomes a party to the Convention.3 Moreover, the 
Convention not only sets out the substantive legal obligations 
with respect to genocide but also provides the only legal basis 
for the ICJ’s jurisdiction.4 
The following analysis first provides an insight into the 
characteristics of genocide under international law, in 
particular under the Genocide Convention. The Article then 
comments on the most important aspects of the judgment and 
discloses the highlights and flaws in the Court’s reasoning. The 
Articles argues strength of the judgment lies in the Court’s 
systematical assessment of the objective and subjective 
elements of genocide. Another positive feature is that the 
Court’s interpretation of main elements of genocide is in line 
with its prior judgment on genocide in 2007 and so contributes 
to consistency and objectivity. One of the main flaws of the 
judgment is the ICJ’s treatment of the jurisdictional challenges 
concerning acts that took place before the respondent state 
Serbia became a party to the Genocide Convention. The Court’s 
arguments in favor of establishing jurisdiction are not 
convincing. In particular, the Court violates the principle of 
state consent upon which jurisdiction is based, because the 
Genocide Convention did not bind Serbia at the time when 
some of the alleged acts took place. The Article then goes on to 
criticize the ICJ’s vast reference to the jurisprudence of 
International Criminal Tribunals and prosecutorial decisions.  
Theses references are problematic because International 
Criminal Tribunals are only concerned with the international 
criminal responsibility of individuals for genocide. The case 
before the ICJ, in contrast, concerns an international wrongful 
act of a state, which is structurally and substantively different 
with respect to its interpretation of the elements of genocide. 
                                                          
3 Id. at art. XIII (detailing terms of entry of the Convention into force 
with respect to signatories thereto). 
4 Id. at art. IX (“Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention . . . shall 
be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the 
parties to the dispute.”). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/3
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The Article also argues that the ICJ interprets some elements 
of genocide too narrowly without the need to do so. In addition, 
the Court has failed to shed light on the interpretation of the 
crime of genocide as an international wrongful act of states 
with respect to many important and highly controversial 
issues, thus missing the opportunity establish clearer 
guidelines for many disputed aspects in the determination of 
genocide in future cases. 
II. Genocide under international law 
Genocide is often called the “crime of crimes”5 because it 
retains—apart from legal relevance—great symbolic 
significance. The use of the word genocide is associated with a 
certain moral stigma. It immediately invokes images of horrors 
and cruelties. This is why states either deliberately employ or 
studiously avoid using the word genocide in their international 
relations.6 
A. Origins of the term ‘genocide’ 
The polish legal scholar Raphael Lemkin invented the 
term “genocide” in 1944.7  He composed it from the Latin “gens, 
                                                          
5  See Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No.: ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and 
Sentence, ¶ 16 (Sept. 4, 1998), 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/KAMBANDA_ICTR-97-
23/KAMBANDA_ICTR-97-23-S.html; Prosecutor v. Serushago, Case No. 
ICTR 98-39-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 15 (Feb. 5, 1999), 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ICTR/SERUSHAGO_ICTR-98-
39/SERUSHAG O_ICTR-98-39-S.htm; WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIME OF CRIMES 227 (2d ed. 2009) (calling genocide 
the “crime of crimes” without implying that there is a hierarchy of 
international crimes) [hereinafter CRIME OF CRIMES]. 
6  See Jim Acosta & Kevin Liptak, Obama won’t call it Armenian 
‘genocide’ on 100th anniversary of atrocity, CNN (Apr. 21, 2015, updated 9:08 
PM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/21/politics/obama-armenian-genocide-
100th-anniversary (reporting that, in the course of the public commemoration 
of the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, politicians deliberately 
avoided the term genocide to describe the atrocities committed by the 
Ottoman Empire to the Armenian population during WWI). 
7  See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF 
OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS 91-93 (1944) 
(providing an extensive legal analysis of German rule in countries occupied 
by Nazi Germany during the course of World War II along with the definition 
of the term genocide) [hereinafter AXIS RULE]. 
5
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gentis” or the Greek root “génos”, meaning “birth, race, stock, 
kind” and from the Latin ending –cidium, which means cutting 
or killing.8 Lemkin had the experience of the Assyrian 
massacre committed by the Ottoman army between 1914-1923 
and in 1933 and the Holocaust committed by Nazi Germany 
during WWII in mind.9 Defining genocide, Lemkin wrote: 
Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the 
immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by 
mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to 
signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, 
with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The 
objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration of the 
political and social institutions, of culture, language, national 
feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, 
and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, 
dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such 
groups.10 
It is interesting to note that even though the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg mentions the 
term genocide and, moreover, some prosecutors used it in their 
Statements of the Offense, the Nuremberg Tribunal’s final 
judgment rather employs the term “crimes against humanity” 
and not genocide to deal with the persecution and physical 
extermination of national, ethnic, racial and religious 
minorities.11 
B. Genocide as a concept of international law 
In the aftermath of the Nuremberg Trials, the UN General 
Assembly finally took up Lemkin’s idea of genocide as an 
international crime and passed a resolution calling for the 
preparation of a convention on genocide.12 The Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was 
signed on  December 9, 1948 and entered into force on  January 
                                                          
8  See ANTONIO CASSESE ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CASES 
AND COMMENTARY 200 (2011) (explaining the etymology of the term genocide). 
9  RAPHAEL LEMKIN, LEMKIN ON GENOCIDE vii (Stephen L. Jacobs ed., 
2012). 
10 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 7, at 79. 
11 SCHABAS, CRIME OF CRIMES, supra note 5, at 36-42. 
12 UN GA Res. 96 (I), UN Doc. A/RES/96(I) (Dec. 11, 1946). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/3
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12, 1951.13 Its current number of 146 member states evidences 
the international community’s overwhelming condemnation of 
genocide.14 The Genocide Convention is the first international 
treaty to embrace the idea of genocide as a crime under 
international law.15 The preamble of the Convention makes 
this clear when stating that the state parties consider 
“genocide . . . a crime under international law, contrary to the 
spirit and aims of the United Nations and condemned by the 
civilized world.”16 Article I of the Convention also confirms 
“that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of 
war, is a crime under international law” and establishes the 
states parties’ obligation to “undertake to prevent and to 
punish” genocide.17 Article II is the heart of the Convention, 
because it defines genocide as 
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as 
such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in 
part; 
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 
Article III then lists five prohibited modalities of the 
commission of genocide (genocide itself, conspiracy to commit 
genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, 
attempt to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide).18 
                                                          
13 Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at 278.  
14 For a list of state parties see International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide  9 December 1948, TREATIES, STATE PARTIES AND COMMENTARIES,  
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp? 
xpviewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_treatySelected=357 (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2015). 
15 Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at art. 1. 
16 Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at Preamble. 
17 Id. at art. 1. 
18 Id. at art. 1. 
7
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Finally, Article IX contains an important jurisdictional 
clause by which the states parties accept the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to “disputes relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present 
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a 
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in 
article III.”19 
Genocide can be committed both in times of peace and in 
times of war.20 It is also prohibited under customary 
international law and the prohibition is generally deemed to be 
ius cogens, a norm of a higher rank, from which no derogation 
is allowed.21 It is noteworthy that the prohibition of genocide 
under customary international law, however, may differ from 
its contents under treaty law.22 
Genocide is closely related to the right to life, a 
fundamental human right which is protected in many 
international human rights conventions and declarations. 
Consequently, genocide is also a matter of international human 
rights law.23 Nonetheless, a structural difference exists in that 
                                                          
19 Id. at art. IX. 
20 Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 1 (affirming genocide can be 
committed “in time of peace or in time of war”). On the relationship between 
genocide and the laws of war, see the discussion below at IV B 6. 
21 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 15, 
23 (May 28), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/4283.pdf [hereinafter 
Reservations] (contemplating that “underlying the Convention are principles 
which are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without 
any conventional obligation”). 
22 This issue has not been resolved yet in practice or in literature. See 
generally JOHN DUGARD, Retrospective Justice: Law and the South Africa 
Model, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 
273 (James McAdams ed., 1997) (noting that “it is by no means certain that 
the Genocide Convention . . . has itself become part of customary 
international law.”). 
23  See e.g. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 
6(2) (“In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of 
death may be imposed . . . not contrary to the provisions of the present 
Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide”);  999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 6(3) (“When deprivation of life 
constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this Article 
shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any 
way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/3
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human rights treaties are in principal concerned with the 
rights of a single individual whereas genocide is associated 
with the right to life of particular human groups. Moreover, 
genocide is not only deemed as an offense against the protected 
groups as such, but also as an offense against the entire 
international community (erga omnes).24 
Another important distinction to be made is between 
genocide as an international wrongful act of states leading to 
state responsibility on the one hand and genocide as an 
international crime leading to individual criminal 
responsibility on the other hand. Genocide is warranted as an 
international crime for which individual persons may be 
prosecuted in the statutes of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal 
Court (ICC). These statutes have in common that they 
reproduce the definition of genocide from Article II of the 
Genocide Convention.25 International criminal law 
distinguished genocide from crimes against humanity, such as 
persecution, by its specific “intent to destroy” a protected group 
in whole or in part. This specific mental element in the 
definition of genocide demonstrates the elevated wrongfulness 
and seriousness of this crime.26 
The different legal bases—international criminal law and 
international public law—also lead to substantial differences 
between the genocide as an individual crime and genocide as 
an international wrongful act of a state. International legal 
scholarship still falls short of addressing many of these 
differences in detail. One difference may arise regarding the 
                                                          
24 See Reservations, supra note 21, at 23-24 (discussing the genesis of 
the concept of obligations erga omnes for jus cogens crimes). 
25 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, art. 4, amended by S.C. Res. 1411, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411 (2002); 
Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 2, S.C. Res. 
955, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (entered into force July 1, 
2002) (sanctioning the crime of genocide). 
26 See generally KAI AMBOS & STEFAN WIRTH, Sentencing, Cumulative 
Charging, Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, in ANNOTATED LEADING 
CASES: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 1994–1999, 
VOL. II 703 (André Klip & Goran Sluiter eds., 2001) (commenting on the 
structure of genocide in comparison to other crimes). 
9
3  INES GILLICH (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2016  9:51 AM 
126 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 28:1 
specific genocidal intent requirement: since a state as such 
cannot commit genocide itself, but only through individuals, 
genocide as a state act necessarily raises questions of 
attribution. Therefore, as a wrongful act of states, genocide, 
either requires the existence of a genocidal state policy or a 
pattern of widespread and systematic violence against a 
protected group from which genocidal intent can be inferred.  
In contrast, the ICJ has held that the individual crime of 
genocide can be committed even in absence of genocidal policy 
of the state or a collective act of violence.27 
 
III. The ICJ’s treatment of challenges to its jurisdiction 
The ICJ only rarely has occasion to decide disputes 
concerning genocide. Apart from the present case, the ICJ’s 
judgment in the case concerning the Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) 
of 2007 is particularly relevant. In that case the Court found 
for the first time a state (the former state union of Serbia and 
Montenegro) to be in breach of the Genocide Convention and, 
moreover, made important remarks on the interpretation of the 
constitutive elements of genocide.28 One of the reasons why the 
ICJ is only rarely concerned with cases of genocide is its 
limited jurisdiction. Unlike the obligatory jurisdiction of 
national courts, jurisdiction of international courts is based on 
the consent of the states.29 This means that states have to 
                                                          
27 Cf. Paola Gaeta, On What Conditions Can a State Be Held Responsible 
for Genocide?, 18 EUR. J. INT’L 631, 631 (2007), 
http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/18/4/236.pdf (arguing that the crime of genocide can 
be committed regardless of the existence of a state genocidal policy, whereas, 
in contrast, the state’s international responsibility necessarily requires such 
a policy). 
28 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 43 
(Feb. 26), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf [hereinafter Bosnia 
Judgment]; see generally Claus Kress, The International Court of Justice and 
the Elements of the Crime of Genocide, 18 EUR. J. INT’L 619 (2007), 
http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/18/4/238.pdf (criticizing the Bosnia Judgment) 
[hereinafter Elements of Genocide]. 
29 Status of Eastern Carelia Case, Advisory Opinion, (1923) P.C.I.J. Ser. 
B., No. 5, at 27 ("[i]t is well established in international law that no State 
can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes . . . either to 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/3
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agree to the ICJ’s judicial supervision.30 Jurisdiction in the 
present case was based on Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute, 
which provides that “the jurisdiction of the Court comprises all 
matters specially provided for in treaties and conventions in 
force.”31 Article IX of the Genocide Convention serves as a 
jurisdictional clause. 
A major admissibility problem in the case under analysis 
arose because the allegations made by Croatia concerned acts 
that had been committed before Serbia became a party to the 
Genocide Convention and, therefore, become bound by the 
obligation not to commit genocide and by the jurisdictional 
clause of Article IX. This issue was not problematic in the 
former case, the Bosnian Genocide Case of 2007, because in 
that case the allegations concerned only acts committed after 
the Serbia acceded to the Genocide Convention.  In order to 
better understand this problem, some remarks on the historical 
and procedural background of the dispute between Croatia and 
Serbia need to be made. 
A. Historical Background: the break-up of the SFRY 
The allegations raised by Croatia concern events that took 
place in the aftermath of the break-up of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the early 1990s. Following 
violent political and social tensions, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia 
and Macedonia declared their independence from the SFRY 
and became independent states between 1991 and 1992. 
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were admitted 
as UN member states on 22 May 1992, while Macedonia was 
admitted as a UN member state on 8 April 1993.32 
On 27 April 1992, Serbia and Montenegro, formed the 
union of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which 
                                                          
mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement"); see 
also Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft and Crew of United States of America, 
(U.S. v. Hungary), Removal from the list, Order, 1954 ICJ Rep 103 (Jul. 12). 
30 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945) (listing 
the different forms in which consent may be given). 
31 Id. 
32 Press Release, United Nations, United Nations Member States, No. 
ORG/1469 (Jul. 3, 2006), http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/org1469.doc.htm. 
11
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would be renamed into Serbia and Montenegro later in 2003, 
gained sovereignty. At first, the FRY claimed to be the (only) 
legal continuator of the former SFRY, and not merely—like the 
other entities—a successor state of the SFRY.33 Being a legal 
continuator would have meant that the FRY would have 
maintained the identical legal personality, and thus would 
have automatically possessed all existing rights and obligations 
of the SFRY. In contrast, the FRY, as a mere successor state, 
would have to be treated as an entirely new state. As a 
consequence, it would not have automatically inherited all the 
righs and obligations of the prior SFRY. The other ex-Yugoslav 
States and the international community—though not 
unequivocally—rejected the FRY’s identity claim and requested 
the FRY to apply anew for UN Membership.34 After having 
done so, the FRY was admitted to the United Nations on 
November 1, 2000.35 In 2006, Montenegro seceded from the 
state union to become an independent state while Serbia 
continued the legal personality of the FRY (i.e. Serbia was 
undisputedly regarded as being identical with the former 
FRY).36 
B. Procedural history of the case 
On July 2, 1999, Croatia filed an application with the ICJ 
against the FRY alleging violations of the Genocide Convention 
that took place between 1991 and 1995. On November 18, 2008, 
the ICJ rendered a decision on preliminary objections raised by 
Serbia against the Court’s jurisdiction. Serbia had raised the 
objections 
(1) that the ICJ lacks jurisdiction over the claims brought against 
the FRY, 
                                                          
33 Statement of 27 April 1992 by the Joint Session of the SFRY 
Assembly, the National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia and the Assembly 
of the Republic of Montenegro, U.N. Doc. A/46/915, Ann. II. 
34  See G.A. Res. 47/1 (Sept. 22, 1992) (determining that “the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue 
automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia in the UN”). 
35 G.A. Res. 55/12 (Nov. 10, 2000). 
36 MARKO MILANOVIC, Territorial Application of the Genocide Convention 
and State Succession, in THE UN GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 488 
(Paola Gaeta ed., 2009). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/3
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(2) that alternatively, the ICJ lacks jurisdiction over claims in 
respect of acts committed before 27 April 1992, and 
(3) that the claims referring to taking effective steps to submit to 
trial certain individuals and return of cultural property are 
inadmissible and moot.37 
The ICJ determined that after the secession of Montenegro 
from the state union with Serbia, Serbia was the sole successor 
state of the FRY/Serbia and Montenegro, and, therefore the 
right respondent in this case.38 The ICJ determined that it had 
jurisdiction to rule on Croatia’s claim in respect of acts 
committed after 27 April 1992, the date when the FRY came 
into existence as a separate state. The ICJ also held that by 
that date, the FRY/now Serbia became a party, by succession, 
to the Genocide Convention.39 With respect to Serbia’s objection 
that the ICJ lacks jurisdiction with regard to acts that had 
been committed before 27 April 1992, the ICJ reserved its 
decision on its jurisdiction to the final judgment.40 
C. The problem of the admissibility ratione temporis 
In the judgment under analysis, the ICJ again affirmed 
that the respondent Serbia was not the legal continuator, but 
rather a successor state of the SFRY. Therefore, Serbia did not 
continue to automatically inherit the legal rights and 
obligations of the SFRY. The Court then acknowledged the 
Genocide Convention does not apply to acts of a state before the 
state has become a party to the Convention. Consequently, the 
Court determined that Serbia became a party to the Genocide 
                                                          
37 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), 2008 I.C.J. Rep. Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, ¶ 21 (Nov. 18), http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/118/14891.pdf [hereinafter Preliminary Objections 
Judgment]. 
38  Id.  at ¶ 34 (referring to statements made by the Serbian President 
and government members that Serbia will continue all memberships and 
international commitments inherited from the FRY). 
39 See id. at ¶ 11 (concluding from statements of FRY officials that “the 
FRY had thus “clearly expressed an intention to be bound . . .  by the 
obligations of the Genocide Convention” and that “the 1992 declaration must 
be considered as having had the effects of a notification of succession to 
treaties, notwithstanding that its political premise was different”). 
40 Id. at ¶ 146. 
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Convention in its own right only as of 27 April 1992.41 
Consequently, according to a strict reading of Article IX, which 
grants the ICJ jurisdiction over the Genocide Convention in 
this case, the ICJ would have had to reject its jurisdiction over 
the alleged acts that took place before that date. Article IX 
establishes that 
disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present 
Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a 
State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in 
article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of 
Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. 
The ICJ, however, did not follow this narrow interpretation of 
Article IX. Instead, the Court’s argument took an interesting 
twist: it asked whether jurisdiction under this clause 
nevertheless is established by means of devolution of the 
SFRY’s responsibility for the alleged violations of the Genocide 
Convention onto Serbia. The SFRY had been a party to the 
Genocide Convention since 1950. Croatia had raised two sets of 
arguments in favor of this position, which the ICJ now had to 
deal with. First, Croatia had argued that the acts before 27 
April 1992 had been committed by a successful insurrection 
movement, in the process of the dissolution of the SFRY. 
Croatia invoked Article 10(2) of the ILC Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
which provides that “the conduct of a movement, insurrectional 
or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State in part of 
the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its 
administration shall be considered an act of the new State 
under international law.”42 
According to Croatia, the conduct of this insurrection 
                                                          
41 Judgment, supra note 1, at ¶ 95-100. 
42 Int’l Law Comm’n, Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 10(2), in Report of the International Law 
Commission, Fifty-Sixth Session, 23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001, 
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement No. 
10 [2001], U.N. Doc. A/56/10, Ch. V (19 Sept. 2001) [hereinafter ILC Articles] 
(providing that “the conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which 
succeeds in establishing a new State in part of the territory of a pre-existing 
State or in a territory under its administration shall be considered an act of 
the new State under international law.”).  
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movement, by operation of the legal principle embodied in this 
provision, should be attributable to Serbia. 
The ICJ rejected this argument and rightly noted that the 
customary law status of this provision is highly controversial.43 
In fact, the ILC Articles are a result of a long-term study 
conducted by the International Law Commission, a body of 
individual experts on international law, in an attempt to codify 
customary international law. In 2001, the ILC presented its 
draft to the UN General Assembly. But the ILC Articles were 
never included in a binding international treaty and the 
General Assembly has never taken position on the customary 
law status of these articles, making their legal status highly 
doubtful.44 
The ICJ went on to note that  
even if Article 10 (2). . .could be regarded as declaratory of 
customary international law at the relevant time, that Article is 
concerned only with the attribution of acts to a new State; it does 
not create obligations binding upon either the new State or the 
movement that succeeded in establishing that new State.45  
The Court’s view is right because the underlying rationale of 
this provision is to maintain the organic or structural 
continuity between the insurrectional movement and the new 
state.46 Thus, devolving attribution of the successful 
insurrection movement onto the new state ensures that a legal 
subject, that can be held responsible for an illegal act, 
continues to exist. Therefore, Article 10 (2) applies only with 
regard to an already existing international obligation, which 
                                                          
43 See generally JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY:  THE GENERAL 
PART 176-178 (2014) (discussing the controversies concerning Article 10 of the 
ILC Articles); see also Patrick Dumberry, New State Responsibility for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts by an Insurrectional Movement, 17 Eur. J. Int’l 
605, 607 (2006) (“Writers generally agree with the principle of the devolution 
of responsibility in the context of governmental changes. They, however, 
rarely address the other question of whether the same principle should apply 
in cases where actions of rebels result not in a change of government, but in 
the creation of a new state.”). 
44 Cf. James Crawford et al., The ILC’s Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: Completion of the Second Reading, 
21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 963, at 963 (2001) (noting the General Assembly’s lack of 
comments). 
45 Judgment, supra note 1, at ¶ 104. 
46 Dumberry, supra note 43, at 608. 
15
3  INES GILLICH (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2016  9:51 AM 
132 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 28:1 
has been established elsewhere, but it does not establish such 
an obligation itself. 
The ICJ then addressed Croatia’s second, and alternative 
legal argument. Croatia argued that, on 27 April 1992, when 
the FRY/Serbia claimed to be the legal continuator of the SFRY 
and that it would succeed to the treaty obligations of the SFRY, 
it also succeeded to the responsibility incurred by SFRY for the 
alleged violations of the Genocide Convention.47 
The ICJ’s reasoning on this point, which will be analyzed 
now, was one of the most controversial issues of the entire 
judgment, as evidenced by the voting scheme (eleven Judges 
voted in favor, six Judges voted against the admissibility) and 
the six separate opinions.48 The ICJ is to be criticized for not 
having taken a clear and unambiguous position on this 
important issue. Instead, the ICJ stated rather cryptically: 
It is true that whether or not the Respondent State succeeds . . . 
to the responsibility of its predecessor State for violations of the 
Convention is governed not by the terms of the Convention but 
by rules of general international law. However, that does not 
take the dispute . . . outside the scope of Article IX . . . The 
disputes subject to that jurisdiction are those “relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment” of the Convention, but it 
does not follow that the Convention stands alone. In order to 
determine whether the Respondent breached its obligations 
under the Convention . . . and, if a breach was committed, to 
determine its legal consequences, the Court will have recourse 
not only to the Convention itself, but also to the rules of general 
international law on treaty interpretation and on responsibility 
of States for internationally wrongful acts . . . The Court 
considers that the rules on succession that may come into play in 
the present case fall into the same category as those on treaty 
interpretation and responsibility of States . . . The Convention 
itself does not specify the circumstances that give rise to the 
responsibility of a State, which must be determined under 
general international law . . .49 
The ICJ concluded that a finding that there is a dispute 
between the Parties “concerning the interpretation, application 
                                                          
47 Judgment, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 82, 106. 
48 See Judgment, supra note 1 (separate opinions issued by Judges 
Tomka, Xue, Skotnikov, Owada, Sebutinde and Kreca). 
49 Judgment, supra note 1, at ¶ 115. 
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or fulfilment of the Convention, which includes disputes 
relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide” would 
suffice for purposes of determining its jurisdiction.50 
The ICJ determined that the question of whether or not 
the FRY/Serbia succeeded to the responsibility of the SFRY is a 
matter to be addressed in the merits, after having assessed 
that the SFRY had in fact violated its obligations under the 
Genocide Convention.51 
The ICJ’s argument is problematic for a number of 
reasons. Before turning to the critique, a few clarifying words 
on the issue of state succession need to be made. 
Whenever a state ceases to exist (as in the SFRY in the 
instant case) and is replaced by another state which has a 
distinct legal personality but is not the legal continuator in the 
territory of the former state (i.e. the FRY/Serbia), a question 
arises as to whether the rights and obligations of the former 
state devolve with respect to the new state.52 This situation is 
generally referred to as state succession. The process of state 
succession can be broken apart into several distinct legal 
aspects, such as succession to treaties, to property, to debts, to 
international organizations, etc. These aspects are governed by 
customary international law, part of which is also codified in 
international treaties.53 
The present case, however, differs from the above 
situation. The present case is not about whether or not Serbia 
has taken the place of the SFRY as a party to the Genocide 
Convention. The ICJ has answered this issue in the negative 
by stating that Serbia is bound to the Genocide Convention in 
                                                          
50 Id. at ¶ 111. 
51 See id. at ¶ 112 (identifying three contested points to be addressed in 
the merits: “(1) whether the acts relied on by Croatia took place; and, if they 
did, whether they were contrary to the Convention; (2) if so, whether those 
acts were attributable to the SFRY at the time that they occurred and 
engaged its responsibility; and (3) if the responsibility of the SFRY had been 
engaged, whether the FRY succeeded to that responsibility.”). 
52 See e.g. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of 
Treaties, art. 2(1)b), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E./10 (defining state succession 
as “the replacement of one State by another in the responsibility for the 
international relations of territory”). 
53 See generally PATRICK DUMBERRY, STATE SUCCESSION TO 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 5-9 (2007) (explaining legal aspects of state 
succession). 
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its own right, i.e. by acceding the Convention as of 27 April 
1992. The present case concerns the question of whether Serbia 
has succeeded in the obligations arising from the (already 
established) violation of the Genocide Convention by the SFRY 
before 1992. In other words: Can the consequences of the 
international responsibility for a breach of the Genocide 
Convention committed by the SFRY be transferred onto Serbia 
as a different legal personality? 
The ICJ answered this question neither in the affirmative 
nor in the negative. Instead, the Court argued that at least the 
existence of a mere dispute regarding the controversial issue of 
state succession to responsibility is sufficient to establish 
jurisdiction under Article IX of the Genocide Convention. 
The ICJ’s broad interpretation of Article IX, however, is 
not covered by the terms of this clause. Article IX is a typical 
example of a so-called compromissory clause. Jurisdiction 
based on such a clause is by its nature limited and narrow.54 
This is because jurisdiction of the ICJ is intrinsically linked to 
the consent of the state parties.55 Naturally, when it comes to a 
dispute, applicants will try to argue to give the Court as wide a 
jurisdiction as possible, whereas respondents will strive for a 
much more restrictive exercise of jurisdiction.56 Therefore, for 
reasons of objectivity, consent must be sought primarily in the 
terms of such a compromissory clause, which must not be 
interpreted against its wording. 
A stricter and more literal interpretation, however, 
suggests that the “dispute” referred to in Article IX must be 
between the Contracting Parties, in this case Serbia and 
Croatia, and it must concern the „interpretation, application 
and fulfilment of the Convention” by exactly these parties.57 
The acts in questions (before 1992), however, do not trigger the 
fulfillment of the Convention by Serbia, but by the SFRY. The 
SFRY is, as the ICJ itself determined, not the legal predecessor 
                                                          
54See ROBERT KOLB, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 432 (2014) 
(commenting on the basis for the ICJ’s jurisdiction). 
55 Id. 
56 See id. (referring to the ICJ case Pulp mills on the Uriguay River 
(2010) as an example to illustrate the opposition between the parties’ 
interests on the one hand and the Court’s cautious attidute in affirming its 
jurisdiction on the other hand). 
57 Judgment, supra note 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka, at ¶ 22). 
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of Serbia, but a different legal entity, which has ceased to exist. 
For these reasons, the ICJ’s view that, in order to establish 
jurisdiction, it was sufficient that the SFRY (and not Serbia) 
was party to the Genocide Convention at the time the acts were 
committed58, must be rejected. 
Also unsatisfactory is the Court’s construction of the scope 
of Article IX to include issues of state succession to 
responsibility by simply declaring that “the rules on succession 
that may come into play in the present case fall into the same 
category as those on treaty interpretation and responsibility of 
States.”59 The Court fails to provide support for its view that 
state succession to international responsibility was governed by 
customary international law.60 Existing state practice on this 
issue is ambiguous.61 Legal doctrine does not provide a 
satisfying answer either. As James Crawford stated: “It is 
unclear whether a new State succeeds to any State 
responsibility of the predecessor State with respect to its 
territory.”62 The fact that rules of state succession to 
responsibility  are neither contemplated in international 
treaties nor in other codifications of international law makes 
this area controversial. 
Admittedly, one could argue in favor of devolution of state 
responsibility that the international wrongful act must not 
remain unpunished because of the application of the rules of 
State succession. However, the very personal character of 
international responsibility speaks against the transmissibility 
of state responsibility. In addition, it would also violate the 
principle of sovereign equality of states: another state cannot 
be held liable for internationally wrongful acts committed by a 
                                                          
58 Judgment, supra note 1, at ¶ 113. 
59 Id. at ¶ 115. 
60 Judgment, supra note 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Kreca, at ¶¶ 60, 
61). 
61 See Vaclav Mikulka, State Succession and Responsibility, in THE LAW 
OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 292-93 (Crawford et al. eds., 2010) (giving 
examples from state practice, such as the dissolution of the Union of 
Columbia in 1831 and the German assumption of liabilities arising from the 
delictual responsibility of the former German Democratic Republic after the 
German reunification in 1989). 
62 Int’l Law Comm’n, Commentary, Commentaries to the Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility, Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n on the Work of its Fifty-
Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, ¶ 3 (2001). 
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different state. An exception can only be made where the 
successor state accepts the responsibility. In the case at hand, 
one could think of reinterpreting Serbia’s claim of identity with 
the SFRY in an implied acquiescence to accept the 
responsibility of the former state for a violation of the Genocide 
Convention. The ICJ, however, did not explicitly advance this 
possible legal construction. 
In addition, state succession to responsibility is not be 
covered by the terms of Article IX.63 The term “disputes 
relating to . . . the responsibility of a State for genocide” in this 
clause refers to state responsibility (i.e. a breach of an 
international obligation by a state) and not to state succession 
to responsibility (i.e. the legal regime governing the devolution 
of rights or obligations from one state onto another). Succession 
and responsibility, therefore, are distinct legal concepts. Thus, 
by importing state succession to responsibility into the terms of 
Article IX, the ICJ broadened its jurisdiction to include acts 
that have been committed before Serbia actually became bound 
by the Genocide Convention.  This unsound construction given 
to Article IX by the ICJ provides a retroactive construction, 
thus violating the fundamental principle that a state can only 
be bound to obligations to which it has consented.64 This 
construction may only be deemed sound if the Court had 
determined that Serbia is the legal continuator of the SFRY 
rather than a successor state. 
Finally, the Court must be blamed for being inconsistent. 
Even if—as the ICJ suggested—state succession to 
responsibility was covered by Article IX, it would have been 
consequential to establish already in the admissibility stage 
whether this doctrine was part of customary international law 
at the time the FRY/Serbia became a party to Genocide 
Convention and if so, whether FRY/Serbia had in fact 
succeeded in the responsibility of the SFRY.65 The Court 
                                                          
63 See Judgment, supra note 1 (Separate Opinions of Judges Sebutinde, 
at ¶ 15, Xue, at ¶ 18 and Tomka, at ¶18) (referring to the drafting history of 
the Genocide Convention in support of their views). 
64 See Judgment, supra note 1 (Declaration of Judge Xue, at ¶ 22 (noting 
that the Court had in fact applied the Convention retroactively). 
65 See Judgment, supra note 1 (Declaration of Judge Xue, at ¶17) and 
Judgment, supra note 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, at ¶ 21) 
(criticizing the inconsistency in the Court’s reasoning); see also Judgment, 
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avoided taking a clear position and shifted this problem to the 
merits, where—after having found that genocide had not been 
committed—it did not need to return to this issue anymore. 
In conclusion, it must be stated that rules of international 
law providing for the devolution of state responsibility have not 
developed.66 Therefore, state responsibility to succession must 
be either generally rejected or regarded as not being covered by 
the terms of Article IX. 
IV. The ICJ’s treatment of the merits 
On the merits, the ICJ held that the acts alleged by 
Croatia constituted the actus reus of genocide pursuant to 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article II of the Convention 
(killings and acts causing serious bodily injury).67 With respect 
to Serbia’s counter claim, the ICJ likewise found the actus reus 
of genocide according to subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article II 
to be established by actions of Croatian armed forces during a 
military operation in 1995.68 The Court found, however, that 
the mens rea of genocide was lacking on the side of both 
parties, and therefore decided that none of the acts constituted 
the crime of genocide under the Genocide Convention.69 
The following section discusses—without any claim to 
completeness—some aspects of the Court’s judgment, which are 
important for the interpretation and evolution of the law of 
genocide beyond the confines of the present case. 
A. Evidentiary value of ICTY cases 
                                                          
supra note 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Skotnikov, at ¶ 2) (explaining that 
ICJ had to “either to identify the legal mechanism by which the FRY 
assumed obligations under the Genocide Convention, and thus make Article 
IX applicable, before it came into existence, or to determine that no such legal 
mechanism existed”). 
66 See JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 424 (2013) (noting that “state succession is an area of 
uncertainty and controversy . . . much of the practice is equivocal”); see also 
Judgment, supra note 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, at ¶¶ 20-22) 
(rejecting state succession to responsibility). 
67 Judgment, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 205, 360. 
68 Id. at ¶ 499. 
69 See the discussion infra at IV.B.5.d. 
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Like in its Bosnian Genocide Judgment of 2007,70 where 
the Court for the first time found a violation of the Genocide 
Convention, the ICJ in the present case again referred 
significantly to proceedings before the ICTY—both to 
determine the facts and with regard to legal conclusions.71 This 
practice of the ICJ raises the question of the relationship 
between the ICJ and International Criminal Tribunals, such as 
the ICTY. 
The ICJ first recalled that the law of genocide—as an 
international crime of individuals on the one hand and as an 
international wrongful act of a state on the other hand—is 
governed by different legal regimes, which in general pursue 
different aims. Despite these differences, the ICJ noted that it 
would nevertheless take into account decisions of international 
criminal courts and tribunals in examining whether genocide 
has been committed.72 
References to statements and decisions of other 
international bodies in principle should be welcomed because 
they contribute to legal coherence and uniformity. Moreover, 
judicial decisions are explicitly assigned a subsidiary means for 
determining international law.73 Nevertheless, the ICJ should 
take a different position when it comes to references to 
international criminal bodies, like the ICTY. The ICJ should 
distinguish between references to findings of fact and 
references to legal determinations made by the ICTY. 
The ICTY’s findings of fact are valuable for the 
proceedings before the ICJ und should be welcomed. The 
ICTY’s mandate is to adjudicate on individual criminal 
responsibility for serious violations of international 
humanitarian law perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia.74 As a 
                                                          
70 Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶ 223. 
71 See e.g., Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 220-294, 308, 376, 393, 473 
(referring to ICTY cases regarding the determination of facts), ¶ 157 
(referring to the ICTY’s interpretation of “serious harm” in the definition of 
genocide) and ¶ 158 (referring the ICTY’s view that rape may amount to the 
actus reus of genocide). 
72 Id. ¶¶ 128-29. 
73 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(d), supra 
note 30 (listing judicial decisions as a supplementary source of international 
law). 
74 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
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more specialized institution, it is in general better equipped to 
investigate the factual circumstances. 
With regard to legal determinations, in particular the 
interpretation of the elements of genocide, however, the ICJ 
should be extremely cautious to refer to the decisions of 
international criminal bodies.75 Relying on legal evaluations in 
the context of international criminal law is problematic 
because of the structural and substantial differences between 
state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility for 
genocide, especially when it comes to determining genocidal 
intent. While criminal tribunals adjudicate on the criminal 
responsibility of individual persons, the ICJ—when assessing 
genocide—is concerned with the cumulative impact of different 
acts committed in a wide area by a large number of 
perpetrators, who may not even be individually identifiable. 
Therefore, the ICJ should not take over legal determinations on 
genocide by International Criminal Tribunals without 
reflection. 
Even more caution should be applied with respect to 
assigning relevance to decisions of the ICTY Prosecutor 
whether or not to include a charge of genocide in an 
indictment. In this regard, the ICJ referred to a passage in its 
2007 Bosnia Judgment, where the Court had stated that “as a 
general proposition the inclusion of charges in an indictment 
cannot be given weight. What may however be significant is 
the decision of the Prosecutor . . . not to include or to exclude a 
charge of genocide.”76 The ICJ fails to explain why the 
Prosecutor’s decision not to charge for genocide may be 
significant, while the Prosecutor’s decision to charge for 
genocide may not. 
Instead of making this distinction, prosecutorial 
decisions—irrespective of their contents—should not be 
assigned legal value for proceedings before the ICJ at all. An 
international criminal Prosecutor is assigned wide discretion as 
                                                          
Yugoslavia, art. 1, supra note 25. 
75 But see Judgment, supra note 1 (Separate Opinion of Judge Skotnikov, 
¶14) (arguing that the ICJ is not competent to decide on genocidal intent and 
stating that the ICJ instead should have better taken notice of the relevant 
proceedings of the ICTY). 
76 Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶ 217. 
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to whether or not to bring a charge and, moreover, he does not 
need to give reasons for his decision.77 It should also be 
considered that the Prosecutor’s decision is not merely based on 
legal, but on a variety of pragmatic considerations, such as the 
cost and length of the proceeding and the availability of 
witnesses.78 Prosecutorial decisions are, therefore, not judicial 
decisions, and consequently are not a supplementary source of 
law according to Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute.79 An 
international Prosecutor has a dual function, acting both as an 
objective ‘administrator of justice’ in the interest of 
international justice when identifying, investigating and 
prosecuting an international crime, and as a subjective party in 
an adversarial trial.80 
In the present judgment, it remains unclear how much 
evidential weight the ICJ places on the decisions of the ICTY 
Prosecutor, because some statements of the ICJ remain 
ambiguous. For instance, while in one passage the Court, after 
having found that genocidal intent is lacking, noted that “the 
ICTY prosecutor has never charged any individual on account 
of genocide,”81  the Court stated in another passage that it “did 
not intend to turn the absence of charges into decisive proof 
that there had not been genocide, but took the view that this 
factor may be of significance and would be taken into 
consideration”.82 
       Similarly nebulous are passages in which the ICJ seems to 
make a distinction regarding the rank and hierarchy of persons 
                                                          
77 See generally Jingbo Dong, Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
International Criminal Court: A Comparative Study, 2 J. POL. & L 109, 112 
(2009) (studying the role of the Prosecutor at the ICC arguing that his 
decision to bring a charge is not governed by the rule of law, but is under his 
discretion). 
78 See, e.g. Prosecutor v. Delalic, IT-96-21-A, Judgment, Appeals 
Chamber (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001),  ¶ 602 
(stating that “the entity responsible for prosecutions has finite human and 
financial resources and cannot realistically be expected to prosecute every 
offender”). 
79 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 30, at art. 
38(1)(d). 
80 Sergey Vasiliev, Trial, in International Prosecutors 728 (Luc Reydams, 
Jan Wouters, Cedric Ryngaert eds., 2012) (commenting on the operational 
function of a prosecutor). 
81 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 440. 
82 Id. ¶ 187. 
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in the chain of command against whom a charge of genocide is 
brought. The ICJ stated “the fact that charges of genocide were 
not included in any of the indictments is of greater significance 
than would have been the case had the defendants occupied 
much lower positions in the chain of command.”83 The ICJ is to 
blame for not further elucidating this issue and setting clearer 
standards for future cases. 
B. Elements of genocide 
According to the definition in Article II of the Genocide 
Convention, the crime of genocide has two requirements:, first, 
that a state commits one of the prohibited acts listed in 
subparagraphs a-e (actus reus) and second, that the state has a 
specific intent when conducting these acts, i.e. the intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group (mens rea).84 As the ICJ has stressed, these two 
elements are intertwined in that “the determination of actus 
reus can require an inquiry into intent . . . [and] the 
characterization of the acts and their mutual relationship can 
contribute to an inference of intent.”85 
The following analysis focuses on select issues relating to 
genocide in the ICJ’s judgment, which are the question of the 
protected groups, the acts necessary for constituting genocide, 
and the existence and proof of the required special intent to 
commit genocide. These issues are also the most controversial 
ones discussed by international doctrine and jurisprudence 
concerning genocide. Therefore, the Court’s view can help to 
clarify and shed light on certain disputed aspects of the law of 
genocide. 
1. Protected “group” 
Both the prohibited acts of subparagraphs (a)-(e) and the 
specific intent refer to a particular object of genocide, which is a 
national, racial, ethnical or religious group. Legal controversies 
concern the question of whether the list of protected groups is 
                                                          
83 Id. 
84 Genocide Convention, supra note 2, at art. II. 
85 Id. ¶ 130. 
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exhaustive or merely illustrative. This issue especially 
concerns the protection of political or social groups, which are 
not explicitly mentioned in Article II. The wording and the 
travaux préparatoires of this provision suggest an exhaustive 
list.86 
Another controversial point is how exactly the terms 
defining the targeted groups should be defined, since the four 
groups contemplated by Article II elude precise definition. 
Should they be construed objectively, from the perception of 
third-party observers, or subjectively, from the perspective of 
the persons involved? If they are to be construed subjectively, 
whose perspective is relevant? The perspective of the 
perpetrators or the self-perception of the targeted group?87 
Moreover, should these groups be defined positively, by the 
existence of certain common characteristics, or negatively, by 
the absence of certain features?88  
In the 2007 Bosnia Judgment, the ICJ had rejected a 
negative construction and, though not unequivocally, indicated 
that it would also reject a purely subjective determination, 
opting for the inclusion of objective criteria.89 
If a perpetrator kills many people believing they constitute 
                                                          
86 See Lars Berster, art. II, in CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND 
PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE;  A COMMENTARY 102 (Christian 
Tams et al. eds. 2014) (pointing out the limitations under the Genocide 
Convention); see also Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Political Genocide: 
Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259, 2261 
(1997) (arguing that that Genocide Convention limits the protected classes to 
those listed in art. 2); but see The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-
4-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998), ¶ 616 (suggesting that other 
groups than those expressly mentioned may be protected because the drafters 
of the Genocide Convention focused not so much on the listed types of groups 
as on trying to find terms to depict groups of a stable and permanent 
character). 
87 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for 
Rwanda Trial Chamber, Dec. 6, 1999) ¶ 56 (employing a subjective definition 
of a group); Claus Kress, The Crime of Genocide Under International Law, 6 
INT’L CRIMINAL L. REV 461, 477 (2006) (opting for an objective definition of a 
group). 
88 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Jelisic, IT-95-10-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 14, 1999), ¶ 70 (employing a negative definition); 
but see Prosecutor v Stakic, Appeals Chamber Judgment, IT-97-24-A (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 22, 2006) ¶ 20 (rejecting a 
negative construction). 
89 Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶¶ 193-96. 
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a protected group, when in fact they are not, this does not 
constitute genocide under the objective definition.90 Instead, it 
constitutes genocide under the subjective approach.91 The 
disadvantage of the subjective approach, however, is that it 
leaves it up to the perpetrator himself to define the crime, 
making the commission of genocide hardly foreseeable and 
determinable for others.92 Therefore, a differentiated, combined 
approach is preferable: an objective criterion to determine 
whether a group constitutes a protected group under the 
Genocide Convention, and a subjective approach in order to 
determine whether a specific individual belongs to the 
protected group. 
In the present Judgment, the ICJ missed the opportunity 
to further clarify its view on this issue, probably because this 
point had not been explicitly contested by Serbia. Instead of 
elaborating more on this point, the ICJ simply determined the 
protected group to be Croat national or ethnical group on the 
territory of Croatia.93 
2. Meaning of subparagraph (b) “Causing serious bodily or 
mental harm to members of the group” 
The ICJ had to decide whether the actus reus of genocide 
in the form of “causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group” under subparagraph (b) was 
established. Legal controversy concerns the meaning of 
“serious”. This term indicates that the bodily or mental harm 
has to meet a certain threshold, but views on the specific 
degree differ in legal scholarship.94 
In the present judgment, the ICJ opted for a narrow 
interpretation by setting the standard high. According to the 
Court “serious” not only refers to the immediate negative 
                                                          
90 L. J. VAN DEN HERIK, THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE RWANDA 
TRIBUNAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 
(Koninklijke Brill NV 2005). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 134-35. 
93 See Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 205 (finding that the Croat national 
group is protected under the Genocide Convention).  
94 See Berster, supra note 86, at 118 (providing further references for the 
definition of “serious”). 
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mental or physical effect on individual group members, but also 
requires that the harm must be of such nature as to contribute 
to the destruction of the targeted group as such.95  The Court 
pointed out that ICTY uses a similar interpretation of “serious 
harm”.96 
In fact, a narrow interpretation finds some support in the 
travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention.97 It is also 
the view taken by the International Law Commission.98 
According to this interpretation, for example, bodily or mental 
torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, rape, sexual 
violence, and persecution would constitute the act of genocide 
since these acts include serious physical and/or mental injuries 
to individual group members and also may have a detrimental 
effect on the group as a whole.99 
However, such a narrow interpretation is not strictly 
required by the term’s literal meaning, its object and purpose 
or from a contextual interpretation. Nothing in Article II 
suggests that the acts listed in subparagraphs (a)-(e) are to be 
construed to require a concrete aptitude to contribute to the 
destruction of the group.100 In addition, such a narrow 
interpretation is not necessary in light of the Convention’s 
object and purpose, since the issue of using ineligible means to 
affect the group as such can be duly addressed when 
establishing the genocidal intent.101 Rather, the meaning of 
                                                          
95 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 157. 
96 Id. ¶ 157 (referring to Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, IT-00-39-T (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Sept. 27, 2006), ¶ 862 and 
Prosecutor v. Tolimir, IT-05-88/2-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Dec. 12, 2012) ¶ 738). 
97 See Berster, supra note 86, at 118 (discussing the drafting history of 
the Genocide Convention). 
98 Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of 
Mankind with commentaries, 51 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 14, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/L.532, corr.1, corr.3 (1996). 
99 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T, Trial Chamber (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 6, 1999), ¶ 51 (accepting genocide for 
acts constituting acts of bodily or mental torture, inhumane or degrading 
treatment, rape, sexual violence, and persecution). 
100 See Berster, supra note 86, at 119 (arguing e contrario with regard to 
the term “calculated to” in subparagraph (c), which stipulates that the 
conditions imposed upon the group have to be capable of causing its 
destruction). 
101 Id. at 119. 
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“serious bodily harm” and “serious mental harm” should be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, using a common sense 
approach. Excluded should only be minor or temporary 
impairment of physical or mental faculties. 
A narrow interpretation, however, may be appropriate to 
restrict a too extensive application of the Genocide Convention 
in cases where the acts are not immediately directed against 
the group members but against third persons.  In the case, 
Croatia had argued to include the psychological suffering of 
relatives of individuals who disappeared in the context of an 
alleged genocide. The ICJ did not accept this argument as such, 
but considered that the persistent refusal of the competent 
authorities to provide these relatives with information, which 
would enable them to establish whether those individuals are 
dead and how they died, may only fall within the scope of this 
provision, if the harm resulting from that suffering contributes 
to the physical or biological destruction of the group.102 For 
example, in a case concerning mass executions in Srebrenica, 
the ICTY Trial Chamber found that, witnessing executions of 
relatives and friends, the victims suffered the further mental 
anguish of helplessness by lying still and listening for long 
hours to the moans of those executed.103 
3. Meaning of subparagraph (c) “Deliberately inflicting on 
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction” 
Acts falling under subparagraph (c), “deliberately inflicting 
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction”, have been described as “measures of slow 
death”.104 International legal scholarship generally construes 
the term “calculated” as including an objective element, in 
addition to the subjective element of intent.105 The exact scope 
of this objective content, however, is a matter of legal 
controversy—with some scholars construing this term to mean 
                                                          
102 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 160. 
103  Prosecutor v. Blagojevic and Jokic, IT-02-60-T, Trial Chamber (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan. 17, 2005), ¶¶ 647-49. 
104 Berster, Convention on Genocide Commentary, supra note 86, at 121. 
105 See id. at 122 (providing further references). 
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that the measure used must be the principle mechanism of 
destruction, while for others a certain capability, possibility or 
probability of bringing about the destruction of the group is 
sufficient.106 
In the present judgment, the ICJ did not endorse a 
position. Nevertheless, the Court seemed to favor an 
interpretation in the sense that the measure inflicted must 
entail some probability with regard to the full or partial 
destruction of the group. This can be inferred from the ICJ’s 
rejection of Croatia’s claim that rape, deprivation of food and 
medical care, looting of property and forced labor of Croats 
constituted the actus reus of subparagraph (c). The ICJ held 
these measures to be on a scale below the threshold of inflicting 
conditions of life on the group capable of bringing about its 
physical destruction.107 
The ICJ must be welcomed for employing the probability 
test. It is a common standard in criminal law to make a certain 
criminal conduct objectively quantifiable. Probability is a 
matter of common knowledge because one who does the act, 
knowing the present state of things, is guilty irrespectively of 
whether it can be proven that he has subjectively foreseen the 
all the consequences. 
The ICJ took great care in establishing whether other acts 
alleged by Croatia qualified as “deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction”.” In this regard, the ICJ, e.g., concluded that 
forcing Croats to wear specific signs to stigmatize the group’s 
members was not aimed at the immediate physical destruction 
of this group. This conducted is rather, as the Court noted, only 
a preliminary step towards the perpetration of the actus reus of 
genocide, because this measure helps to identify the group. 
Nevertheless, the ICJ announced that this measure can be 
taken into account for establishing the mens rea of genocide, 
the existence of genocidal intent.108 
The ICJ also confirmed its position taken in the 2007 
Bosnia Judgment with regard to ethnic cleansing or forced 
                                                          
106 Id. at 123. 
107 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 364-72, 385, 393.  
108 Id. ¶ 382. 
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displacement In the Bosnia Judgment, the ICJ had defined 
ethnic cleansing as “rendering an area ethnically homogenous 
by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given 
groups from the area”.”109 When drafting the Genocide 
Convention the states did not consider ethnic cleansing or 
forced displacement as a stand-alone act of genocide. However, 
they were of the view that at least some aspects of the forcible 
expulsion of a protected group should be included in 
subparagraph (c) of Article II (“deliberately inflicting on the 
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction”).110 
Discussing whether the alleged forced displacement or 
ethnic cleansing of Croats in the case under analysis should be 
characterized as the actus reus under this subparagraph, the 
ICJ cited its Bosnia Judgment, where it had explained that 
[n]either the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area 
‘ethnically homogeneous’, nor the operations that may be carried 
out to implement such policy, can as such be designated as 
genocide: the intent that characterizes genocide is ‘to destroy, in 
whole or in part’ a particular group, and deportation or 
displacement of the members of a group, even if effected by force, 
is not necessarily equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is 
such destruction an automatic consequence of the 
displacement . . . In other words, whether a particular operation 
described as ‘ethnic cleansing’ amounts to genocide depends on 
the presence or absence of acts listed in Article II of the Genocide 
Convention, and of the intent to destroy the group as such.111 
The ICJ stressed that the circumstances, in which the 
forced displacements were carried out, are critical.112 
Regarding Croatia’s allegations in this case, the Court found 
that the restrictions on the movement of the Croats contributed 
to a climate of coercion and terror. They were aimed at forcing 
those persons to leave the territories controlled by Serb forces. 
The Court also acknowledged that restrictions on freedom of 
                                                          
109 Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶ 190. 
110 See Berster, Convention on Genocide Commentary, supra note 86, at 
132 (explaining that Syria’s proposal that the Convention should contain an 
expansive conception of genocide which includes forced mass exodus was 
rejected by the other state parties). 
111 Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶ 190. 
112 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶163. 
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movement may undermine the social bond between members of 
the group, and hence lead to the destruction of the group’s 
cultural identity. The Court, however, found no evidence to 
conclude that these measures were carried out in 
circumstances calculated to result in the total or partial 
physical destruction of the group.113 
The ICJ’s restrictive and cautious approach is to be 
welcomed. This is because restrictions on the free movement of 
persons or groups of persons can pursue different (either 
legitimate or illegitimate) aims, for example security or 
economic reasons according to a specific government policy. 
One example is ’Israel’s relocation policy in the occupied 
Palestinian territories. These restrictions are not per se 
indicative of an actus reus of genocide. 
However, such measures may serve as an early warning 
sign. This was correctly noted by the ICJ when adding that, 
nonetheless, measures of forced displacement occurring in 
parallel acts falling under Article II may be “indicative of the 
presence of a specific intent (dolus specialis) inspiring those 
acts”.114 In this regard, the relocation policy of Nazi-Germany 
concerning Jews during World War II serves an example of a 
measure indicating genocidal intent. 
4. Meaning of subparagraph (d) “Measures intended to 
prevent births within the group” 
With respect to subparagraph (d) “Measures intended to 
prevent births within the group” the ICJ commented on the 
disputed issue whether this provision includes rape. According 
to the Court’s view, rape under certain conditions may fall 
within the scope of this provision. The Court referred to the 
ICTR’s decision in Akayesu. There, the ICTR had stated that 
the mental effects of rape could lead members of the group not 
to procreate and that rape therefore, especially in patriarchal 
societies where membership of a group is determined by the 
identity of the father, could be “an example of a measure 
intended to prevent births within a group”115 
                                                          
113 Id. ¶ 380. 
114 Id. ¶ 434. 
115 ICTR-96-4-T ¶¶ 507-08. 
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In the case at hand, the ICJ did not have enough elements 
to evaluate this issue because Croatia could not provide 
sufficient evidence that rape was committed specifically with 
the intention to prevent births within the group.116 
5.  Genocidal intent 
The subjective side of genocide or the mens rea, requires 
the existence of two separate mental elements. First, the 
perpetrator’s mens rea concerning the fulfillment of all the 
objective criteria of the prohibited acts of genocide listed in the 
subparagraphs of Article II. Second, the specific intent (dolus 
specialis) to “destroy” the targeted group, in whole or in part. 
As the ICJ rightly emphasized, it is the second mental 
element, the specific genocidal intent, the intent to “destroy”, 
that contributes to the elevated wrongfulness of genocide, 
making this crime distinguishable from other international 
crimes.117 
The determination of the specific mental element of 
genocide is difficult. There are huge practical difficulties in 
determining the existence of such intent, because it is 
impossible to peek into the minds of the perpetrators. In cases 
before the ICJ dealing with international wrongful acts of 
states, rather than persons, another aspect, in addition, comes 
into play: Usually, international courts when deciding on state 
responsivity are only concerned with objective criteria: to 
determine whether a norm of international law has been 
violated and whether the violation is attributable to a state. 
The existence of a specific subjective or mental state of the 
state is not relevant for establishing state responsibility; 
subjective elements are alien elements when it comes to 
international wrongful act of states and state responsibility. 
Instead, they are typical elements in establishing international 
criminal responsibility of individual persons in the area of 
international criminal law. Genocide is the only exception, 
because it requires the existence of a mental element, even 
with regard to state conduct. It follows from this exceptional 
character of genocide, that the ICJ, as a body adjudicating on 
                                                          
116 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 397. 
117 Id. ¶ 132. 
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violations of international obligations by states, unlike 
International Criminal Tribunals, is generally not so 
experienced with handling a mens rea element. 
a) The intent to “destroy” (a group in whole or in part) 
International doctrine generally employs two different 
approaches to establish genocidal intent, which are known as 
the knowledge-based approach and the purpose-based 
approach. These two approaches differ in that they either 
stress the cognitive element (knowledge-based approach) or 
emphasize the volitional element concerning the special 
purpose, in the genocidal intent (purpose-based approach).118 
For example, under the knowledge-based approach, a 
perpetrator acts with the mens rea of genocide when he 
willingly commits a prohibited act with the knowledge that his 
action would bring about the destruction of a protected group, 
or alternatively, with the knowledge that his conduct would 
contribute to other acts being committed against the group, 
which when put together, would bring about the destruction of 
that group, in whole or in part.119 Therefore, for the second 
alternative, a plan or state policy, or positive knowledge of the 
context in which genocide occurs would be necessary. 
Under the purpose-based approach, the perpetrator must 
consciously desire his prohibited act to result in the destruction 
of the group in whole or in part and he must know that his acts 
will likely cause such an effect. 
The ICJ, like in its 2007 Bosnia Judgment, though not 
expressly stating it, followed the purpose-based approach by 
requiring that the destruction of the group was the primary 
goal or purpose of the conduct.120 This approach best fits the 
                                                          
118 See e.g. Berster, Convention on Genocide Commentary, supra note 86, 
at 136; Kress, Elements of Genocide, supra note 28, at 625 (explaining the 
different approaches to genocidal intent in legal scholarship). 
119  See Katherine Goldsmith, The Issue of Intent in the Genocide 
Convention and Its Effect on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide: Toward a Knowledge-Based Approach Genocide Studies and 
Prevention, 5 Genocide Studies and Prevention 245 (2010) (naming as an 
example from English law a situation where a person obtains a gun, willingly 
aims it at someone, and pulls the trigger). 
120 See Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 134-136; Bosnia Judgment, supra 
note 28, ¶ 188 (employing the purposed-based approach to determine 
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language in the definition of genocide in Article II of the 
Genocide Convention. Moreover, the attribution of intent to a 
perpetrator who, under the knowledge-based approach, only 
foresaw the destruction of the group is a too low standard. A 
low standard is not justifiable given the incredibly significant 
stigma that is attached to the crime of genocide. Therefore, a 
high standard of intent and, consequently, a high burden of 
proof must apply in genocide cases. 
The ICJ then elaborated on the question whether the term 
“destroy” only includes the physical or biological destruction, or 
whether it also encompasses the destruction of the targeted 
group as a social entity.121 Lemkin, the author of the term 
genocide, considered the intent to destroy in a broad way. In 
his view, genocide starts with the perpetrator’s intent to 
destroy the group’s economic life or its cultural and social 
characteristics, culminating in its physical destruction as the 
ultimate stage.122 The German Constitutional Court in the 
Jorgic Case also favors a broad interpretation of the term 
“destroy” in the sense to include the social or cultural 
destruction of a group.123 The European Court of Human 
Rights upheld this interpretation and argued that the broad 
interpretation of intent to destroy does not appear 
unreasonable when read within the systematic context of the 
prohibited conduct, which includes measures intended to 
prevent births in a group and the forcible transfer of children of 
the group to another group.124 
The ICJ has taken a different approach and, by doing so, 
has aligned itself in the jurisprudence of International 
Criminal Tribunals.125 In the present judgment, the ICJ 
                                                          
genocidal intent). 
121 See generally Kress, Elements of Genocide, supra note 28, at 625 
(commenting on the definition of “destroy”); see also Prosecutor v. Krstic, IT-
98-33-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber, Aug. 2, 
2001) at ¶ 580 (rejecting a social conception as a proper definition for the 
term “destroy”). 
122 LEMKIN, AXIS RULE, supra note 7, at 87-89. 
123 See In Re Jorgic, 2 BvR 1290/99 (Federal Constitutional Court, 
Germany, Dec. 12,  2000) at ¶ III(4)(a)(aa) (interpreting Article 220a of the 
German Criminal Code). 
124 Jorgic v. Germany, No. 74613/01 (E.Ct.H.R., July 12, 2007) ¶¶ 103-
113. 
125 See The Prosecutor v Krstic, IT-98-33-T, supra note 121, ¶¶ 576-580 
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followed the reasoning in its 2007 Bosnia Judgment by 
rejecting a broad interpretation of “destroy”.126 The Court 
concluded that the specific intent is to be interpreted narrowly, 
requiring that the perpetrator must have intended the physical 
or biological destruction of the protected group.127 
In fact, the drafting history of the Genocide Convention 
supports the ICJ’s view, by suggesting a narrow interpretation 
of the term destruction, which encompasses only the physical 
or biological destruction.128 Such a narrow interpretation is also 
supported by a systematic interpretation of Article II of 
Genocide Convention, since all prohibited acts listed in 
subparagraphs a-e refer to a conduct, which results in a 
physical destruction. Thus, interpreting the term destroy 
otherwise would disconnect the umbrella clause from the 
prohibited modalities of the commission of genocide.129 
The Genocide Convention expressly envisages situations 
where a group may be targeted for destruction “in part”.” In the 
present case, the ICJ had to take position on the question of 
how large the targeted “part” must be to meet the threshold for 
genocidal intent. 
The Genocide Convention and its travaux préparatoires 
remain silent on this issue. It is argued that, in light of the 
protective purpose of the Genocide Convention, only such 
fractions, whose destruction would affect the entire group’s 
existence, may qualify.130 
The ICJ cited from its 2007 Bosnia Judgment, in which it 
had determined that the term “in part” must be understood as 
“substantial part”.”131 According to the ICJ, the substantiality 
criterion must be assessed by reference to a number of factors, 
such as the geographical location of the targeted group, the 
                                                          
(opting for a narrow interpretation of intent). 
126 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶¶ 134-136; Bosnia Judgment, supra note 
28, ¶ 190. 
127 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 36. 
128 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission 
on the work of its forty-eighth session, UN Doc. A/51/10 (6 May 1996-26 July 
1996), at 90-91 (displaying the drafting history of the Genocide Convention). 
129 Kress, Elements of Genocide, supra note 28, at 627. 
130 Berster, Convention on Genocide Commentary, supra note 86, at 148-
49. 
131 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 142. 
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area of the perpetrator’s activity and control, and the 
prominence of the targeted part within the group as a whole.132 
Regarding the latter factor, the ICJ referred to the ICTY’s 
Krstic decision, in which the tribunal noted that 
“[i]f a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall 
group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding 
that the part qualifies as substantial.”133The ICJ, using a 
slightly modified language than in its 2007 Judgment, 
transformed these factors for the first time into a tripartite test 
to determine whether the substantiality requirement is met. 
The Court explained, “[i]n evaluating whether the allegedly 
targeted part of a protected group is substantial in relation to 
the overall group, the Court will take into account the 
quantitative element as well as evidence regarding the 
geographic location and prominence of the allegedly targeted 
part of the group.”134This test applied to the case under 
consideration, the ICJ first delineated the Croats living in 
specific regions (Eastern and Western Slavonia, 
Banovina/Banija, Kordun, Lika and Dalmatia) as the relevant 
part of the targeted group.135 Then, the ICJ went on to assess 
whether this identified part was substantial. The Court found 
that “the ethnic Croat population living in the [identified] 
regions . . . numbered between 1.7 and 1.8 million 
[individuals . . . and] constituted slightly less than half of the 
ethnic population living in Croatia.”136 The ICJ further stated 
“that acts committed by JNA and Serb forces in the [identified] 
regions . . . targeted the Croats living in those regions, within 
which these armed forces exercised and sought to expand their 
control.”137 With respect to the criteria of the prominence of the 
group, the Court found that Croatia had not provided any 
information on this point.138 This, however, did not preclude 
the Court from generally finding that “the Croats living in the 
                                                          
132 Id.  
133 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber Apr. 19, 2004) (referred to 
by the ICJ in the Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶ 200). 
134 Judgment, supra note 1,  ¶ 142. 
135 Id. ¶ 403. 
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identified regions formed a substantial part of the ethnic Croat 
group living within the territory of Croatia during the relevant 
period.”139 
A closer look at the Court’s reasoning reveals that the 
Court has not only reaffirmed the substantiality criterion 
enunciated in its 2007 Bosnia Judgment, but, has also 
systematized the different factors of this criterion by setting 
out a formula for a tripartite test to assess whether the 
substantiality threshold is met. Despite the slightly different 
language employed, the ICJ has not departed from its 2007 
test, but only renamed and restructured it. The test 
pronounced by the Court in the present Judgment suggests 
that the three criteria for the substantiality test (quantitative 
element, geographic location and prominence) are to be applied 
in an egalitarian manner. There is no normative order between 
these factors. 
With this adapted substantiality test, the ICJ has aligned 
itself with the jurisprudence of International Criminal 
Tribunals as well as the majority view among legal 
commentators.140 Nevertheless, it must be criticized that, 
beyond this welcome clarification of the standard applied in its 
prior Judgment, the criteria set out in the tripartite test 
remain vague. In conclusion, the ICJ again has missed out the 
opportunity to set out further parameters that would provide 
guidance to future cases. 
b) Proof of genocidal intent 
To prove genocidal intent is an extremely difficult task. In 
contrast to the determination of physical acts, which are visible 
and therefore can be proven by reference to a number of 
objective criteria, looking inside the mind of a perpetrator is 
impossible. In fact, many perpetrators cannot be held 
responsible for committing genocide because of the high 
threshold that applies to genocidal intent. The Armenian 
Genocide of the early 20th century is a good example where, 
                                                          
139 Id. 
140 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Krstic, supra note 121, ¶ 12; Prosecutor v. 
Tolimir, supra note 96, ¶ 749; Berster, supra note 86, at 149 (arguing in favor 
of the substantiality test). 
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despite the international community’s overwhelming 
condemnation of the events as genocide, Turkey, the legal 
continuator of the then-existing Ottoman Empire, still denies 
that it had acted with genocidal intent.141 
Especially when it comes to determining genocidal intent 
of a state, difficulties arise because the state is an abstract 
entity which, unlike individual persons, per se does not possess 
a particular state of mind. Therefore, in order to hold the state 
internationally responsible for genocide, it is crucial to 
attribute the actions of individual perpetrators to the state. 
When it comes to establishing genocidal intent of the state, the 
question, therefore, is whether the intent of an individual 
acting alone or in a group is sufficient, or if the presence of a 
particular state policy is required. In this regard, it must be 
recalled again that the nature of individual criminal 
responsibility is fundamentally different than that of state 
responsibility for genocide. Consequently, different standards 
to prove genocidal intent may apply.142  
In the case under consideration, the ICJ faced the difficult 
task of establishing whether Serbia and Croatia had acted with 
the necessary mens rea. The ICJ began its analysis with an 
extensive discussion on the standard and burden of proof of 
genocidal intent. The Court first recalled the general 
procedural rule that the party alleging a fact also bears the 
burden of proof for that fact.143 Regarding the standard of 
proof, the ICJ referred to its 2007 Bosnia Judgment, where it 
had held that “claims against a State involving charges of 
                                                          
141  Cf. John Kifner, Armenian Genocide of 1915: An Overview, N.Y. 
TIMES, 
http://www.nytimes.com/ref/timestopics/topics_armeniangenocide.html 
(explaining the events that led to the Armenian Genocide). 
142  Compare Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Judgment, ¶ 48 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Appeal Chamber July 5, 2001) 
(stating that “[t]he existence of a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient of the 
crime, although it may facilitate proof of the crime”) with Kress, supra note 
67, at 461 (arguing that genocide as a state act requires the existence of a 
state policy, or at least a collective destructive act). See also the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) Elements of Crimes for Article 6 of the ICC Statute 
(departing from the case law of International Criminal Tribunals in requiring 
proof that genocide occurred “in the context of a manifest pattern of similar 
conduct directed against that group”). 
143 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 172. 
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exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is fully 
conclusive . . . the same standard applies to the proof of 
attribution for such acts.”144The ICJ also clarified a passage 
from its 2007 Bosnia Judgment, where it had noted that 
inference of genocidal intent must be “the only possible 
inference.” This formulation had caused some confusion among 
scholars, because it slightly differed from the statement made 
by the ICTY that “such a finding must be the only reasonable 
conclusion available from the evidence.”145 The ICJ now took 
the chance to explain that the ICTY’s criterion is in substance 
identical with that laid down by the Court in its 2007 
judgment.146 
Evaluating the Court’s statement, it must be noted that 
such a high standard of proof for genocidal intent goes beyond 
the usual test applied by the ICJ in regular cases of 
international responsibility of states. In fact, such a high 
standard resembles only standards of proof for guilt in criminal 
proceedings. On the one hand, applying such a high standard 
makes it particular difficult to prove genocide. On the other 
hand, a strict test is justified because of the special character 
and stigma that is attached to genocide as the “crime of 
crimes.” 
c) The ICJ’s assessment of the evidence 
The ICJ first noted that it could not find an explicit state 
policy to commit genocide by the Croatian or Serbian 
government. Therefore, the ICJ found it necessary to establish 
whether a pattern of conduct existed, from which genocidal 
intent—as the only reasonable inference—could be drawn.147 In 
order to prove the existence of such a pattern of conduct by 
Serbia, Croatia had advanced a number of factors.148 The ICJ 
                                                          
144 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 178; Bosnia Judgment, supra note 28, ¶ 
209. 
145 Prosecutor v. Tolimir, supra note 96, ¶ 34.  
146 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 148. 
147 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 148 (referring to the Bosnia Judgment, 
supra note 28, at ¶ 373). 
148 Id. at ¶ 408 (determining the factors advanced by Serbia as: The 
political doctrine of Serbian expansionism (1), statements of public officials 
and propaganda of state controlled media (2), that the pattern of attacks far 
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examined only those factors that 
[C]oncern the scale and allegedly systematic nature of the 
attacks, the fact that those attacks are said to have caused 
casualties and damage far in excess of what was justified by 
military necessity, the specific targeting of Croats and the 
nature, extent and degree of the injuries caused to the Croat 
population.149 
According to ICJ these factors implied a pattern of widespread 
attacks, conducted according to a similar modus operandi, by 
Serb forces on localities with Croat populations. But the Court 
determined that intent to destroy the group, either totally or 
partially, was not the only reasonable inference that could be 
drawn from this pattern of conduct.150 Similarly, the ICJ did 
not find genocidal intent on the part of Croatia when assessing 
Serbia’s counter-claim.151 
                                                          
exceeded any legitimate military objective (3), contemporaneous video footage 
(4), the explicit recognition by the JNA that paramilitary groups were 
engaging in genocidal acts (5), the close co-operation between the JNA and 
the Serb paramilitary groups implying close planning and logistical support 
(6), the systematic nature and scale of the attacks on Croats (7), that ethnic 
Croats were constantly singled out for attack while local Serbs were excluded 
(8), that ethnic Croats were required to identify themselves and their 
property by special marks (9), the number of Croats killed and missing as a 
proportion of the local population (10), the nature, degree and extent of the 
injuries inflicted (through physical attacks, acts of torture, inhuman and 
degrading treatment, rape and sexual violence), “including injuries with 
recognizable ethnic characteristics” (11), the use of ethnically derogatory 
language in the course of killing, torture and rape (12); the forced 
displacement of Croats and the organized means adopted to this end (13); the 
systematic looting and destruction of Croat cultural and religious 
monuments(14); the suppression of Croat culture and religious practices (15); 
the consequent permanent and evidently intended demographic changes to 
the regions concerned(16); the failure to punish the crimes (17)). 
149 Id. ¶ 413.  
150 Id. ¶¶ 416, 424-26 (finding that the aims of the Serb forces included, 
i.e. a political objective to unite Serb areas in Croatia in order to establish a 
unified territory and creating an ethnically homogeneous Serb State) and ¶ 
430 (finding that the intent of the perpetrators was not to physically destroy 
the members of the protected group, as such, but to punish them because of 
their status as enemies in a military sense.) 
151 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 500 (rejecting Serbia’s argument that 
genocidal intent can be inferred from the actual language of the transcript of 
the meeting held at Brioni on 31 July, 1995 and, in any event, from the 
pattern of conduct that is apparent from the totality of the actions decided 
upon and implemented by the Croatian authorities during and immediately 
after Operation “Storm.”) 
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Evaluating the Court’s reasoning, it has to be concluded 
that the Court’s rejection of genocidal intent of Croatia and 
Serbia is consequential, considering the high threshold which 
applies. Nevertheless, the Court did not make it really clear 
why it only focused on only some of the factors advanced by 
Croatia to establish genocidal intent. The arguments of the 
Court on this point remain superficial.152 
6.   Relevance of the Law of War 
A final observation need to be made regarding the relevance of 
International Humanitarian Law, or the Law of War, in the 
present judgment. The ICJ briefly addressed the issue of 
whether acts committed during an armed conflict must, in 
order to constitute the actus reus of genocide, be unlawful 
under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This issue was 
under dispute between Croatia and Serbia because Serbia had 
argued that acts committed by Serb forces occurred during a 
“legitimate combat” with Croatian armed forces.153  The ICJ 
noted that it does not “rule, in general or in abstract terms, on 
the relationship between the Genocide Convention and 
international humanitarian law”.”154 The ICJ acknowledged 
that, while the Genocide Convention and IHL are two distinct 
bodies of rules, pursuing different aims, IHL might 
nevertheless be relevant in order to decide whether the alleged 
acts constitute genocide within the meaning of the Genocide 
Convention.155 Accordingly, the ICJ made in different places 
throughout the judgment some remarks on the illegality under 
IHL of certain acts, which it considered relevant for the 
determination of the actus reus and mens rea of genocide. For 
example, with regard to the actus reus of genocide, the ICJ 
referred to the ICTY Mrkšić case. In that case the Tribunal had 
determined that a military operation against Croat forces had 
been carried out in an indiscriminate way, directed deliberately 
against the civilian population, in contrast to IHL.156 With 
                                                          
152 For a possible explanation, see concluding remarks.  
153 Id. ¶ 152. 
154 Id. ¶ 153. 
155 Id. 
156 Judgment, supra note 1, ¶ 472. 
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regard to subparagraph (b), the ICJ again referred to the ICTY, 
which had found that certain Croat Prisoners of War had been 
subject to ill treatment and torture, perpetrated by Serb 
forces.157 Also, IHL seemed to be relevant to the ICJ for 
establishing the mens rea of genocide. In this regard, the ICJ 
explained its special consideration of only some of the factors 
advanced by Croatia to proof genocidal intent with the fact 
“that those attacks are said to have caused casualties and 
damage far in excess of what was justified by military 
necessity”.158 The ICJ seemed to regard the illegality of a 
conduct under IHL, especially a violation of the principle of 
military necessity or proportionality, as an indicator for 
genocidal intent. Concerning Serbia’s counter-claim, the ICJ 
also referred to IHL when noting that the legality of the 
shelling of Serbian villages by Croat forces during a military 
operation indicated that the mental element of genocide was 
lacking.159 
In international scholarship the relationship between the 
law of genocide and IHL has not been satisfyingly settled. 
Insofar, the ICJ’s statements in this Judgment provide an 
interesting contribution to the discussion. 
V. Concluding remarks 
With its Judgment in Croatia v. Serbia of 2015 the ICJ—at 
least in a juridical senje—closed a 15-year old violent chapter 
of the post-Yugoslav history. One of the lasting (political and 
historical) contributions of the judgment is to set a record for 
history of the horrible events that have happened. In addition 
to its political significance, the ICJ’s ruling has also made an 
important legal contribution to the international law of 
genocide. By largely following the path set out in the ICJ’s 
2007 Bosnia judgment, the present judgment contributed to a 
coherent legal approach the interpretation of the main 
elements of genocide, even though it must be citizen that the 
Court sometimes remains too vague with respect to disputed 
aspects of this crime. One of the major themes throughout the 
                                                          
157 Id. ¶ 308. 
158 Id. ¶ 413. 
159 Id. ¶¶ 474-75. 
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entire judgment is the Court’s general restrictive approach 
regarding the interpretation of the actus reus and mens rea of 
genocide by which the Court has set a high threshold for 
allegations of genocide in future cases. Strongly criticized must 
be the ICJ’s treatment of the jurisdictional problem concerning 
alleged acts that took place before Serbia became bound by the 
Genocide Convention in its own right. Notwithstanding these 
problematical aspects, the ICJ’s recent decision on the 
Genocide Convention, overall, is to be welcomed. The legal 
impact of this judgment reaches beyond the dispute between 
Serbia and Croatia in the present case. This is not only because 
decisions of the ICJ are an authoritative statement of the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations, but also because 
judicial decision in general serve as a supplementary means of 
interpretation for international law. The ICJ’s contribution to 
the international law of genocide, therefore, will certainly serve 
as a guideline for other courts and legal practitioners in dealing 
with future cases concerning genocide. 
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